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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by virtue of § 78-2a-3(2)(j), U.C.A. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW and 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in reducing by nearly 50% the amount of 
attorney fees awarded to Appellants/Defendants where such fees were supported by 
affidavit and detailed billing records and where the trial court expressly found that such 
fees were reasonable. 
Standard of Review: The amount and reasonableness of a trial court's award of 
attorney fees is ordinarily a question of law with some measure of discretion given to the 
trial court in applying the reasonableness standard to a given set of facts, i.e., it is a mixed 
question of law and fact. See Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 892 (Utah 1996); 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994); Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 
830 P.2d 266, 268 (Utah 1992); Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 164 P.2d 985, 988 
(Utah 1988). SeeRushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, | 1 , 977 P.2d 1201; Taylor 
ex rel C.T. v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, f6, 977 P.2d 479. 
However, the sufficiency of a trial court's findings that support an award of attorney 
fees is reviewed under a correction-of-error standard. See Anderson v. Doms, 
1999 UT App 207 [^9. Although trial courts are normally afforded broad discretion in 
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determining what constitutes a reasonable fee, such an award "must be based on the 
evidence and supported by findings of fact." See id.; Salmon v. Davis County, 
916 P.2d 890, 893 (Utah 1996). 
2. Issue: Whether the trial court erred when it denied Appellants'/Defendants' 
motion for additional attorney fees and costs incurred in collecting the original judgment 
against Appellees/Plaintiffs, particularly when Appellees/Plaintiffs filed no objections to 
such motion. 
Standard of Review: Whether attorney fees are recoverable is a question of law 
which is reviewed for correctness. See Anderson v. Doms, 1999 UT App 207 f 9 {citing 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 314 (Utah 1998)). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: 
This is a breach of contract case that flowed from prior litigation between the parties.1 
After more than three years of hostile and bitter litigation, the parties entered into a 
1
 The parties are many. They include a corporation, Custom Steel Fabrication, 
and six individuals, all of whom were related to each other. The Appellants in this appeal 
represent only four of the individuals. Custom Steel and two individuals, Heidi Bishop 
and Mark Garamendi, were dismissed from the case. For convenience, the three 
dismissed parties are referred to herein as "Custom Steel, et alT Following their 
dismissal, the trial court awarded to them $1,330 in attorney fees, the exact amount 
requested by their counsel. (R. 192-95, 204, 208.) 
-2-
Global Settlement Agreement ("Agreement").2 However, despite the terms of the 
Agreement, Mr. Blevins concocted a plan to thwart the Agreement's benefits to 
Custom Steel, et al. 
Mr. Blevins attempted to divert to his friend the very funds that he was to turn over to 
Custom Steel, et al He did this by instigating with a friend of his an action to garnish the 
funds that he was holding for Custom Steel, et al 
During the garnishment action, Mr. Blevins' plan was defeated. In the process, 
however, Custom Steel, et al incurred substantial legal fees. As a result, Custom Steel, 
et al commenced an action against Mr. Blevins3 for breach of the Agreement and to 
recover the legal fees incurred in defending against the contrived garnishment action. 
In the action brought by Custom Steel, et al, Appellees failed to timely file a 
counterclaim, and their belated request to do so was denied. Undaunted, Appellees 
commenced a separate action (the same underlying action which is the subject of this 
appeal) against Custom Steel, et al and added the four Appellants, claiming breach of the 
Agreement. Early in this action, the trial court dismissed Custom Steel, et al, based on 
2
 In 1995, Mr, Blevins loaned money to Custom Steel Fabrication at a 48% 
interest rate. Following default by Custom Steel and judgment against it, Mr. Blevins 
seized equipment from Custom Steel. During the seizure, he allegedly assaulted 
Heidi Bishop and wrongfully seized personal property belonging to her and 
Mr. Garamendi. Further litigation ensued. The Agreement was to resolve all claims 
between the parties. 
3
 Although Mr. Blevins was the principal actor, his wife was included in the action 
because she was also a party to the Agreement. 
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Rule 13, Utah R. Civ. P., and based on the doctrine of res judicata. (R. 173-75.) The 
remaining defendants, comprising the four Appellants herein, were then left to defend 
against Appellees' four causes of action. 
Course of Proceedings and Relevant Facts: 
After filing multiple motions for summary judgment on each cause of action, 
Appellants eventually prevailed on all causes of action. (R. 484-86.), attached hereto as 
Addendum 1. Appellants also defeated a motion for summary judgment brought by 
Appellees. Id. 
All causes of action brought by Appellees represented claims that Appellants 
breached the Agreement, (R. 1-13.), which Agreement provides attorney fees to the 
prevailing party. (R. 288, 485 |^4.) Since Appellants prevailed on all causes of action, the 
trial court awarded attorney fees to Appellants. Addendum 1 at 2 ^4. Counsel for 
Appellants submitted affidavits of fees, (R. 441-44,465-67.), attached hereto as 
Addendum 2, including detailed billing records. (R. 445-53.), attached hereto as 
Addendum 3. 
Without challenging any specific items contained in such billing records, Appellees 
opposed the amount of fees. (R. 460-64.), attached hereto as Addendum 4. In support of 
their objection, Appellees submitted a single affidavit by a practicing attorney who 
opined that fees in these types of cases should not exceed 50% of the amount in 
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controversy, which, based solely on information from Appellees, he was led to believe to 
be approximately $7,000.4 (R. 455-58.), attached hereto as Addendum 5. 
Although Appellees requested a hearing on the issue of attorney fees, Addendum 4, 
the trial court failed to hold any hearing on the issue of fees. Instead, the only evidence in 
the record in support of or in opposition to an award of attorney fees, as they relate to 
Issue No. 1, are the following documents: 
1. Affidavit and Amended Affidavit of counsel for Appellants 
(R. 441-44, 465-67.), Addendum 2; 
2. Detailed billing records of Appellants' counsel (R. 445-53.), Addendum 3; 
3. Appellees' memorandum of objections. (R. 460-64), Addendum 4; and 
4. Affidavit of a local attorney, Brent Stephens. (R. 455-58.), Addendum 5. 
The amended affidavit of Appellants' counsel requests fees in the amount of $11,538. 
Addendum 2. Without entering any findings to support a reduction in fees, the trial court 
entered an award of attorney fees in the amount of $6,050. Addendum 1 at 3. More 
puzzling, the trial court's final order and judgment included the following paragraph: 
The Court, having previously granted summary judgment in favor 
of Defendants on the First Cause of Action and now by granting 
4
 Although Appellees' Complaint specifies some dollar amounts for damages, 
Attorney Brent Stephens states in his affidavit that he was informed that the amount in 
controversy was approximately $7,000. (R. 457 f 9.) However, prior to his affidavit, 
Appellees had claimed in their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment damages in the 
amount of $16,620. (R. 274.) 
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summary judgment on all remaining causes of action, and after 
reviewing the affidavit of attorney fees submitted by Defendants and 
finding such fees to be reasonable, orders and . . . 
Addendum 1 at 3 {emphasis added) 
Entry of final judgment was made on February 1, 2003, ("Judgment"). Based on the 
trial court's substantial reduction in the amount of attorney fees and based on the trial 
court's failure to provide any findings to support such reduction, Appellants then filed on 
February 27, 2002 their Notice of Appeal (R. 491-92.) 
Appellants also began efforts to collect the Judgment from Appellees.5 Appellees 
rebuffed all attempts to collect the Judgment by first filing a Motion to Quash 
Supplemental Order and then submitting to Appellants a formal request for discovery.6 
Finally, Appellees deposited with the Clerk of the trial court an amount equal to the 
Judgment amount and simultaneously requested a stay to prevent collection of the 
Judgment.7 There was no legal basis for Appellees' request for a stay because their 
5
 After February 1, 2002, the date when the Final and Judgment was entered, 
Appellants filed the following: Order in Supplemental Proceedings (3/8/2002) 
(R. 495-97.); Application for Garnishment (4/4/2002) (R. 513-14.); Motion to Augment 
Judgment (4/12/2002) (R. 528-29.); and First Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Costs 
Relating to the Collection of Judgment (4/12/2002) (R. 530-36.). 
6
 In response to Appellees' attempts to defeat collection of the Judgment, 
Appellants filed the following: Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Quash 
Supplemental Order (3/29/2002) (R. 500-04.); and Motion for Protective Order 
(4/8/2002) (R. 517-18.); 
7
 Appellees filed a Motion to Quash Supplemental Order (4/1/2003) (R. 506-511.) 
and a Notice of Supersedeas Bond (4/11/2002) (R. 526-27.) At the supp order hearing, 
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deposit could not be considered a supersedeas bond. (R. 546.) Since Appellees had not 
filed an appeal, the trial court denied the request. Id. The trial court then entered an order 
entitled Order Forfeiting Bond. The Order permitted Appellants to take from the Clerk of 
the trial court the Appellees' deposit. (R. 537-39.) 
Upon collecting the Judgment, Appellants requested additional attorney fees and 
costs that were incurred during the collection process. (R. 528-36.) The amount of such 
fees and costs requested by Appellants is $2,107. Id. The trial court denied without 
comment Appellants' request.8 (R. 628.) Appellants then filed a second Notice of Appeal 
(R. 630.) and subsequently requested this Court to consolidate both appeals. That request 
was granted. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
After Appellants prevailed through summary judgment on all causes of action, the 
trial court first reviewed the affidavit of attorney fees that was filed by counsel for 
Appellants. In its Final Order and Judgment, the trial court found such fees to be 
reasonable. Although Appellants' affidavit of fees requested $11,538, the trial court 
Judge Medley, sitting for Judge Dever, ordered a $200 bail on a bench warrant for 
Mr. Blevins because of Mr. Blevins' failure to appear as ordered. (R. 575-76.) 
8
 The trial court "denied" Appellants' Motion to Augment Judgment by filing an 
unsigned order and pasting a note on it with the word "Denied" written on the order. 
(R. 581.) To permit an appeal, Appellants needed a signed order. Over a three month 
period of time, Counsel for Appellants wrote two letters to Judge Dever requesting him to 
sign an order denying Appellants' Motion to Augment Judgment. (R. 626-27.) 
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entered only $6,050. However, the trial court failed to make any findings in support of 
such a reduction. This is clear error. See Anderson v. Doms, 1999 UT App 207 [^9. 
Examination of all evidence in support of a reduction could not reasonably lead to a 
reduction of fees. Appellees filed objections and supported them with an affidavit from a 
local attorney. However, such attorney was not qualified as an expert and his credibility 
is undermined because he failed to support his opinion with any law. Appellees contend 
that an award of attorney fees should not exceed 50% of the amount in controversy. Such 
contention is without any basis in law, is actually contrary to law, and Appellees cite no 
rule or law to support their contention. 
Even if the amount of controversy were relevant, Appellees' purported expert 
admitted that his information about the case came solely from Appellees and their 
counsel. He was informed that the amount in controversy was $7,000, but Appellees had 
previously claimed more than $16,000 in damages in their Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
In a similar manner, the trial court denied Appellants' request for $2,107 in attorney 
fees and costs for post-judgment collection activities. Again, the trial court failed to make 
any findings of fact to support such a denial. And again, Appellees made similar 
arguments against the award of any fees. 
For both Issue No. 1 and 2, the trial court was in error based on its failure to make 
any findings to support its reduction of fees on Issue No. 1 and its denial of post-
judgment fees and costs on Issue No. 2. 
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ARGUMENT 
ISSUE NO. 1: 
Whether the trial court erred in reducing by nearly 50% the amount of 
attorney fees awarded to Appellants where such fees were supported by 
affidavit and detailed billing records and where the trial court expressly 
found that such fees were reasonable. 
I. The trial court erred when it reduced Appellants' attorney fees without first 
entering any findings of fact to support such a reduction. 
Appellants prevailed on all causes of action, and the trial court correctly awarded 
attorney fees to them based on the attomey-fee-provision contained in the underlying 
Agreement and on which this action was solely based. Addendum 1. Appellants' counsel 
submitted to the trial court an affidavit of attorney fees and costs in the amount of 
$11,538. Addendum 2. His affidavit was supported by detailed billing records. 
Addendum 3. 
Concurrently with the affidavit and billing records, Appellants also submitted a 
proposed Final Order and Judgment. Addendum 1. Appellees opposed the amount of fees 
and submitted a memorandum of objections, Addendum 4, and an affidavit by 
Brent Stephens, a local practicing attorney. Addendum 5. 
No hearing was held by the trial court, although Appellees demanded an evidentiary 
hearing. Addendum 4. Instead, the trial court entered a Final Order and Judgment after 
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first modifying the proposed Order that Appellants had submitted. The trial deleted 
several lines of text, including partial lines. Addendum 1. 
The trial court left intact the following text in the Final Order and Judgment: 
Since the Settlement Agreement expressly provides for attorney 
fees to the prevailing party, Defendants are determined to be the 
prevailing party and are therefore entitled to reasonable attorney fees. 
Addendum 1 at 2. 
The Court, having previously granted summary judgment in favor 
of Defendants on the First Cause of Action and now by granting 
summary judgment on all remaining causes of action, and after 
reviewing the affidavit of attorney fees submitted by Defendants and 
finding such fees to be reasonable, orders and 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs' 
Motions for Summary Judgment on the Second, Third and Fourth 
Causes of Action be granted and that Plaintiffs5 Complaint be dismissed 
in its entirety with prejudice and on its merits. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants be awarded their 
reasonable attorney fees in the amount of $6,050 . 
Addendum 1 at 3. 
Although the affidavit of attorney fees and costs, supported by detailed billing 
records, requested $11,538, the trial court entered the figure of $6,050 as shown above. 
The trial court provided no explanation nor made any findings to support such a 
reduction. This Court should, therefore, review the sufficiency of the trial court's 
findings under a correction-of-error standard. See Anderson v. Doms, 
1999 UT App 20719. Under such standard, this Court should find that the trial court's 
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reduction was in error, since the trial court totally failed to support its reduction in fees 
with any findings of fact. See id.; Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 893 
(Utah 1996). 
Not only did the trial court completely fail to support its reduction in fees, it acted 
contrary to its own ruling. The trial court found Appellants' attorney fees to be 
reasonable when it ruled that 
The Court,. . . after reviewing the affidavit of attorney fees 
submitted by Defendants and finding such fees to be reasonable, . . . 
Addendum 1 at 3. 
The plain meaning of the trial court's ruling is that it first reviewed the affidavit of 
attorney fees submitted by Appellants and then it found those fees to be reasonable. 
There can be no other logical meaning given to the trial court's ruling. Once the trial 
court found the attorney fees to be reasonable, it had no basis to reduce those fees from 
$11,538 down to $6,050, unless it supported such reduction with other findings not in 
conflict with its conclusion that such fees are reasonable. 
While it is a fact that counsel for Appellants drafted and submitted to the trial court 
the Final Order and Judgment, the trial court most assuredly reviewed such Order. 
Moreover, it would appear that the trial court carefully reviewed the proposed Order. 
This conclusion is based on the trial court's extensive modification of the Order. In 
particular, of the 21 lines of text on page 2 of the Order, the trial court deleted more than 
8 lines of text, or nearly 40% of such text. The trial court also deleted part of a line of 
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text on page 3 of the proposed Order, which is the same page containing the particular 
paragraph on the reasonableness of attorney fees. 
It is reasonable, therefore, to conclude that the trial court signed the proposed Order 
after first carefully reading the text of the entire Order. As such, the particular paragraph 
containing the trial court's conclusion about the reasonableness of Appellants' attorney 
fees was intentionally left intact without any modification. In effect, it is reasonable that 
the trial court's ruling was intended to reflect its own analysis, findings and conclusions 
in a similar manner as the trial court's deletions most assuredly reflect its analysis, 
findings and conclusions. 
IL Even if the trial court had weighed all of the evidence presented to it on the issue 
of attorney fees, such evidence could not reasonably lead to the reduction of fees 
entered by the trial court. 
Appellants are aware that they must marshal all of the evidence in the record that 
could possibly support the trial court's reduction of attorney fees. In doing so, Appellants 
will show that such evidence could not reasonably lead to the reduction of fees entered by 
the trial court. The only evidence in the record to support a reduction of fees are the two 
documents filed by Appellees: (1) Appellees' objections to the amount of attorney fees, 
Addendum 4; and (2) the affidavit of attorney Brent Stephens. Addendum 5. These two 
documents will now be examined and analyzed in detail. 
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Appellees failed to identify any particular itemized fee contained in the billing 
records. Addendum 4. Instead, Appellees simply argue, in less than two pages, that such 
fees were unreasonable based on the affidavit of Brent Stephens and based on their 
contention that an hourly billing rate of $175 and $185 was too high for Appellants' 
counsel. Id. An analysis of each argument made by Appellees will show the inadequacy 
of Appellees' objections. To avoid repetition in the following analysis, all four objections 
analyzed are contained in Appellees' memorandum, attached hereto as Addendum 4, and 
its supporting affidavit from attorney Brent Stephens, attached hereto as Addendum 5. 
First, Appellees contend that fees are too high because three of four causes of action 
were uncontested. This is a disingenuous argument, particularly since Appellees 
commenced this action and they included all four causes of action in their Complaint. If 
three of the four causes of action were actually uncontested, Appellees should be subject 
to Rule 11 sanctions and their counsel should be subject to ethical violations. In reality, 
none of the causes of action were uncontested. 
While it is true that Appellees filed a non-opposition memorandum to Appellants' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the First Cause of Action, such non-opposition 
came only after Appellants' motion and memorandum had been filed. Once Appellees 
received Appellants' memorandum, with its supporting documents and affidavit from 
attorney Richard Perkins, they realized that they could not prevail. So they simply 
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folded. However, Appellants had already expended a substantial amount of work before 
Appellees folded.9 
The same procedure occurred for the Second and Fourth Causes of Action. After 
Appellants expended a substantial effort, Appellees conceded those claims. 
Appellees not only vigorously defended against Appellants' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment on the Third Cause of Action, they also filed a Cross-Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment on the Third Cause of Action, including an affidavit from 
Mr. Blevins which contained substantial hearsay. (R. 266-293.) 
Therefore, Appellees' contention that three of the four causes of action were 
uncontested has little significance and could not reasonably lead to a reduction of fees. 
Such causes of action only became uncontested after it became clear from the substantial 
memoranda and evidence prepared by Appellants that Appellees could not prevail. Had 
Appellees not included in their Complaint the three causes of action that they later 
conceded, Appellants would not have been required to defend against them nor to incur 
attorney fees. Appellees' failure to properly evaluate their claims before asserting them 
has now come back to haunt them; they now try to avoid paying for their own failure. 
9
 The First Cause of Action involved a claim for money that was allegedly unpaid 
by one of the Appellants and which arose from a prior bankruptcy proceeding. Upon 
investigation, it was determined that such money had in fact been paid to Appellees' 
counsel well before this action was commenced. To properly support a Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Appellees were required to obtain the appropriate documents and to 
obtain an affidavit from the attorney involved in the bankruptcy proceeding. 
Approximately 6 hours were spent on such activity. 
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Second, Appellees contend that "discovery" was limited to two sets of written 
discovery by Appellants and one set of written discovery by Appellees. Appellees 
provide no further elaboration or details. Without more, such statement, even if 
considered as evidence, could not reasonably lead to any conclusion about the extent of 
work involved in the case. For instance, the number of hours contained in the billing 
records spent on discovery were not analyzed by Appellees nor was any effort made by 
Appellees to determine if such hours were unreasonable. Also, Appellees never asserted 
that the amount of discovery was unreasonable. Accordingly, Appellees' second 
objection could not reasonably lead to a reduction of fees. 
Third, Appellees contend that the fees sought are unreasonable in light of the amount 
in controversy. Appellees also support their contention with an affidavit from a local 
attorney, Brent Stephens. However, the amount in controversy set forth by Appellees in 
their memorandum of objections is inconsistent with the amount sought by Appellees in 
their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Third Cause of Action. (R. 273-74.) 
In their motion, Appellees sought $16,620. When added to their First Cause of Action, 
the total sought by Appellees was $17,820, plus unspecified damages, costs, interest, and 
attorney fees as provided by the underlying Agreement. This represents a great deal more 
than the $6,830 stated in their memorandum of objections. In other words, Appellees 
intentionally misrepresented the amount in controversy to support their contention that 
fees were too great. Nonetheless, the amount in controversy is not a determinative factor. 
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Appellees contend that total fees "should not be for more than 50% of the amount 
sought or defended against in a commercial case having no significant legal or 
constitutional issues." Addendum 4 at 4. Appellees offer no law to support such a 
contention. Rather, Appellees rely solely on the affidavit of Brent Stephens as their 
authority. 
Although Mr. Stephens was not qualified as an expert by the trial court,10 he states 
that from his experience, " . . . reasonable fees would not exceed fifty percent of the 
amount in controversy, as the facts have been explained to me in this type of case as 
explained to me as previously noted." Addendum 5 at 4. First of all, Mr. Stephens' 
knowledge of the case came entirely from Mr. Blevins and his counsel. Such input is 
obviously one-sided as evidenced by Mr. Stephens' misunderstanding of the amount in 
controversy. He was informed by Mr. Blevins and his counsel that the amount in 
controversy was approximately $7,000. But this amount is completely inconsistent with 
the $16,620 sought by Appellees on their Third Cause of Action. This illustrates the bias 
and misinformation that was intentionally conveyed to him by Appellees. 
Notwithstanding the amount in controversy, Mr. Stephens only states his experience. 
He cites no law in support of any rule, formula or policy that suggests or mandates that 
10
 From a Lexis search, Mr. Stephens has participated in only two appeals in the 
past 10 years and he failed to prevail in either of them. His experience with overturning a 
trial court's ruling is weak at best. The attempt by Appellees to present Mr. Stephens as 
an expert on this issue fails. Mr. Stephens was never qualified by the trial court as an 
expert and Appellants never had an opportunity to cross examine him or dispute his 
testimony except in their reply memorandum. (R. 471-480.) 
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attorney fees are to be limited to 50% of the amount in controversy. Since such a 
suggestion is unsupported and even contrary to Utah law on the issue, this "evidence" 
cannot reasonably lead to a reduction in fees. Further, the failure of Mr. Stephens to even 
acknowledge or cite case law on the issue undermines his credibility to testify on the 
appropriate amount of attorney fees. 
For example, Mr. Stephens ignored the holding in Dixie State Bank: 
In addition, although the amount in controversy can be a factor in 
determining a reasonable fee, care should be used in putting much 
reliance on this factor. It is a simple fact in a lawyer's life that it takes 
about the same amount of time to collect a note in the amount of SLOOP 
as it takes to collect a note for $100.000. As stated in Cabrera: 
The total amount of the attorneys fees awarded in this 
case cannot be said to be unreasonable just because it is 
greater than the amount recovered on the contract. The 
amount of the damages awarded in a case does not place a 
necessary limit on the amount of attorneys fees that can be 
awarded. 
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988); American 
Vending Servs. v. Morse, 881 P.2d 917 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
In American Vending Services, this Court cited four factors for determining the 
reasonableness of attorney fees as previously set forth in Dixie: 
In Dixie State Bank, the supreme court listed four questions that the trial 
court should answer in arriving at a reasonable amount for attorney fees: 
1. What legal work was actually performed? 
2. How much of the work performed was reasonably necessary to 
adequately prosecute the matter? 
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3. Is the attorney's billing rate customarily charged in the locality for 
similar services? 
4. Are there circumstances which require consideration of additional 
factors, including those listed in the Code of Professional 
Responsibility? 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
The amount in controversy is not included among the four factors cited in Dixie and 
as reaffirmed in American Vending Services. Counsel for Appellants filed his affidavit 
with detailed billing records to show the work performed. Neither Appellees nor the trial 
court found any item contained in those records to have been unnecessary or 
unreasonable. 
It is also important to note that Appellees fail to offer any reasonable alternative 
available to Appellants. Should Appellants have merely defaulted and permitted 
Appellees to freely prosecute their claims with little or no defense, merely on the basis 
that attorney fees could be greater than the amount in controversy? Since attorney fees 
are provided by the Agreement, is it not reasonable that the amount in controversy also 
include the amount of attorney fees? And, since attorney fees are provided by the 
Agreement, including those fees on appeal, (R. 288), is it not also reasonable that 
Appellants should rely on that contractual provision to cover their attorney fees and not 
merely weigh the required effort against the damages sought by Appellees? 
Based on the foregoing, there is no basis in law to support Appellees' contention that 
attorney fees are to be limited to 50% of the amount in controversy, regardless of whether 
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the amount is $7,000 or $17,000. Moreover, the affidavit of Mr. Stephens should not be 
given much if any weight since he is not an expert and his opinion is contrary to 
established law. 
Fourth, Appellees contend that the hourly rate of Michael Jensen, counsel for 
Appellants, is too high, given his experience. However, Appellees offer no evidence that 
such hourly rate is unreasonable. Appellees also suggest that Mr. Jensen's hourly rate 
ought to be less than customary because of the kind of office used by him. However, 
Appellees have no basis or evidence for making such a statement and it is patently false. 
They do not know the number of offices from which Mr. Jensen practices law.11 
Furthermore, it makes no difference on how efficient or inefficient an attorney is in 
the operation of his law office. The issue is not how much or how little expenses are. 
Rather, it is whether the rate charged is reasonable and customary in the community 
where the attorney practices. Appellees offer no comparisons to rates charged by other 
attorneys.12 
11
 In reality, Mr. Jensen practices out of two offices, one in downtown Salt Lake 
City and a home office in Murray. In effect, Mr. Jensen maintains telephone lines, 
computers, fax machines, copiers and filing systems in both locations. Under Appellees' 
theory, having two offices should justify charging a higher hourly rate than is customary. 
12
 During the many years of litigation with Appellees, Mr. Jensen learned from the 
hourly rate charged by Appellees' counsel. Through affidavits submitted by counsel for 
Appellees, it was learned that he charged $175 an hour. Therefore, it appears that counsel 
for Appellees is comparing his experience and competency with that of Mr. Jensen. 
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More importantly, the trial court previously approved Mr. Jensen's hourly rate. 
(R. 173-75.) The trial court approved his attorney fees when Custom Steel, et al were 
dismissed and the trial court awarded attorney fees to them. Id. If the hourly rate was 
reasonable during that phase of the case, it surely is reasonable for the remainder of the 
case. 
Finally, Appellees contend that an attorney's hourly rate should be a formula tied to 
the number of years in practice as an attorney. However, no rule or case law supports 
such a contention and Appellees have failed to cite any such rule or law. An attorney's 
hourly rate is a function of many variables, only one of which is the number of years in 
practice as an attorney. Other factors such as education, work experience, maturity and 
judgment are important in establishing a reasonable hourly rate. Competence and 
intellect of an attorney are additional factors. 
In this case, the proof is in the pudding. Counsel for Appellees allowed his clients to 
bring this case when a more competent attorney would or should have known that 
Appellees' claims were without merit. Appellees contend that three out of four causes of 
action were not contested. But Appellees did not lose their case based on newly 
discovered evidence. Rather, Appellees lost because they had no legally cognizable 
claims. All claims were dismissed on summary judgment. Do these facts suggest that 
counsel for Appellants is less competent than counsel for Appellees? Obviously not. 
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Based on all the evidence before the trial court, such evidence and arguments could 
not reasonably lead to a reduction of fees, particularly where there are no findings made 
by the trial court to support such a reduction. 
ISSUE NO. 2: 
Whether the trial court erred when it denied Appellants' motion for 
additional attorney fees and costs incurred in collecting the original 
judgment against Appellees, particularly when Appellees filed no 
objections to such motion. 
III. The trial court erred when it denied Appellants' attorney fees incurred during 
the collection process. 
On April 12, 2002, Appellants filed a Motion to Augment Judgment to recover 
attorney fees and costs incurred while collecting and attempting to collect on the 
Judgment. (R. 528-29), attached hereto as Addendum 6. Appellees vigorously defended 
against all collection efforts. When Appellants were finally able to serve Mr. Blevins 
with an Order in Supplemental Proceedings, Appellees filed on April 1, 2002, a Motion to 
Quash Supplemental Order. (R. 506-511) And on April 3, 2002, Appellees also served 
Appellants with post-judgment discovery requests.13 (R. 512) Finally, on April 11, 2002, 
Appellees deposited with the Clerk of the trial court a personal check in the amount of the 
After Appellants filed a Motion for Protective Order, Appellees withdrew their 
discovery requests. (R. 551-52) 
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Judgment and simultaneously filed a Notice of Supersedeas Bond. Appellees also 
obtained a hearing on the same day, April 11, 2002, at which the trial court denied the 
bond and permitted Appellants to obtain Appellees' deposit. (R. 537-39.) 
In response to Appellees' aggressive defenses during the collection phase, Appellants 
filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Quash Supplemental Order (R. 500-04.) 
and a Motion for Protective Order. (R. 517-18.) Appellants, through counsel, also 
appeared at two hearings: (1) for the Supplemental Proceeding, at which Mr. Blevins 
failed to appear (R. 575-76); and (2) for the Notice of Supersedeas Bond, at which the 
trial court ruled against Appellees and approved and entered the Order Forfeiting Bond 
(R. 537-39). 
Appellants filed with their Motion to Augment an affidavit of fees and costs "relating 
to the collection of Judgment," including detailed billing records attached to the affidavit 
(R. 530-36), attached hereto as Addendum 7. Counsel for Appellants spent 11 hours in 
the collection of the Judgment, including time at the hearing held on April 11, 2003, and 
$72 in advanced costs for a writ of garnishment, to serve Appellees' bank with the writ, 
and for service of process to serve the Order in Supplemental Proceedings. The Motion 
to Augment sought a total of $2,107 in fees and costs. Concurrently with the Motion, 
Appellants submitted a proposed order and judgment, but the proposed order was filed 
unsigned with a handwritten note stating "denied." (R. 581-82) 
Since there is no appeal from an unsigned order, counsel for Appellants twice wrote 
letters to the trial court requesting that it enter a signed order denying the Motion to 
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Augment Judgment. (R. 626-27) Finally, on September 22, 2002, the trial court entered 
its order denying Appellants' Motion to Augment Judgment. (R. 628-69), attached hereto 
as Addendum 8. 
The Denial Order, Addendum 8, contains one relevant paragraph, besides the denial 
of fees and costs: 
"The Court, having reviewed Defendants' Motion to Augment 
Judgment and its supporting Affidavit of Attorney Fees, and finding no 
opposition to the motion, denies the Motion finding that fees are 
unreasonable'' 
Denial of First Order and Judgment, (R. 628), Addendum 8 {emphasis added). 
The trial court deleted the word "no" before the word "opposition" and added the text 
that is in italics and underscored: '[finding that fees are unreasonable." As in Issue No. 1, 
the trial court made no findings of fact to support its ruling. 
Although trial courts are normally afforded broad discretion in determining what 
constitutes a reasonable fee, such an award "must be based on the evidence and supported 
by findings of fact." See Anderson v. Doms, 1999 UT App 207 f9.; Salmon v. Davis 
County, 916 P.2d 890, 893 (Utah 1996). Here, the trial court again failed to support its 
denial of fees and costs. Simply stating that "fees are unreasonable" is not sufficient to 
support such a conclusion, especially when detailed billing records were available to the 
trial court. This Court should, therefore, review the sufficiency of the trial court's 
findings under a correction-of-error standard. See Anderson v. Doms, 
1999 UT App 207 ^|9. Under such standard, this Court should find that the trial court's 
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denial of fees and costs was in error, since the trial court totally failed to support its denial 
with any findings of fact. See id; Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 893 
(Utah 1996). 
IV. Even if the trial court had weighed all of the evidence presented to it on the issue 
of post-judgment attorney fees and costs to collect on the Judgment such 
evidence could not reasonably lead to the reduction of fees entered by the trial 
court 
As with Issue No. 1, Appellants are aware that they must marshal all of the evidence 
in the record that could possibly support the trial court's denial of attorney fees and costs. 
In doing so, Appellants will show that such evidence could not reasonably lead to the 
Denial Order entered by the trial court. The only evidence in the record to support the 
denial of fees and costs is one document filed by Appellees: Appellees' objections, which 
were belatedly filed. (R. 564-65), attached hereto in Exhibit A of Addendum 9. 
It is important to note the procedural steps leading to the trial court's Denial Order. 
First, Appellants filed on April 12, 2002, their Motion to Augment Judgment. 
Addendum 7. On April 30, 2002, 18 days later, Appellants filed their Notice to Submit 
for Decision. On May 3, 2002, Appellees filed an Objection to Form of Order and Notice 
to Submit Re: Motion to Augment Judgment. (R. 562-65), attached hereto as 
Addendum 9. 
Appellees Objections assert that they had filed a memorandum in opposition and 
attached such memorandum as Exhibit A. Addendum 9. However, the record does not 
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support Appellees' contention. There is no record of any memorandum in opposition to 
Appellees' Motion to Augment Judgment being filed until they did so on May 3, 2002, 
when they filed a single paragraph as an Exhibit A. Addendum 9. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Appellees failed to file a timely memorandum in 
opposition to Appellants' Motion to Augment Judgment, the content of their belated 
memorandum and opposition is comprised of a single paragraph as follows: 
"Given Defendants Counsel's length of experience in the practice of 
law, the fact that he offices in his home and has next to no overhead, the 
lack of difficulty of the post-judgment issues herein, the rates charged 
and the amount of time allegedly incurred are excessive. " 
Addendum 9. 
Appellees again fail to cite to any particular task itemized in the billing records filed 
by Appellants. And again Appellees make the same arguments made in opposition to the 
attorney fees sought following the entry of the Judgment. Appellants incorporate herein 
by reference the arguments made in Part II above. 
The record is clear that Appellees avoided collection. Not only did Mr. Blevins not 
appear at the Supplemental Proceeding, Appellees took the extraordinary step of filing a 
Motion to Quash the Order in Supplemental Proceeding. Appellees also engaged in 
dilatory and unjustifiable activities when they served post-judgment discovery requests on 
Appellants. (R. 512) Although they subsequently withdrew their discovery requests, it 
was only after Appellants filed their Motion for Protective Order. (R. 517-18, 551-52) 
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Based on the aggressive defense and conduct of Appellees, the time (11 hours) spent 
by Appellants' counsel is reasonable in performing the following: obtain and serve an 
Order in Supplemental Proceeding; obtain and serve a Writ of Garnishment; prepare and 
file a Motion for Protective Order; attend two hearings; and prepare the appropriate Order 
Forfeiting Bond and collecting thereon. In addition, $72 in costs were incurred. 
The trial court's conclusion that such fees are unreasonable is not supported by the 
evidence in the record. In effect, the trial court's ruling provides for no fees or costs for 
collection activities. That is contrary to the provision of the Agreement that provides for 
fees and costs, it is also contrary to Utah law. 
In Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court 
addressed the issue of "fees for fees." 
Although this court has not directly addressed the issue of whether fees 
incurred in recovering fees allowed under a statute should also be 
awarded pursuant to the statute, we agree with the rationale articulated 
in American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 
3882 v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 301 U.S. App. D.C. 293, 
994 F.2d 20 (D.C. Cir. 1993): 
Federal courts have repeatedly recognized that the 
unavailability of ,ffees for fees" could render fee-shifting 
provisions impotent, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the 
underlying statutes. . . . An award of "fees for fees" is not 
merely a remote descendant of the underlying action from 
which it derives. Rather, it is an integral aspect of the 
statutory scheme on which the underlying claim is based. 
994 F.2d at 22;. . . 
Analogously,... attorney fees incurred in enforcing a contract should 
also include fees incurred on appeal. In Management Services v. 
Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406, 408-09 (Utah 1980), we stated 
that the purpose of an attorney fees provision is to indemnify the 
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prevailing party against the necessity of paying attorney fees and 
thereby enable him to recover the full amount of the obligation. Id. at 
409. . . . Similarly,... the prevailing party in a dispute over a 
contractual attorney fees provision was entitled, not only to attorney fees 
on appeal, but also to the fees it incurred establishing the reasonableness 
of the fees for which it was entitled to be indemnified. James 
Constructors v. Salt Lake City, 888 P.2d 665, 674 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
If the fee-shifting provision of the Agreement is to have its intended meaning, then 
Appellants are entitled to their fees during the collection process as well as on appeal. 
The trial court's denial of any attorney fees and costs incurred in the collection process is 
plain error and this Court should remand or instruct the trial court to enter an augmented 
judgment in the amount of $2,107 as requested and supported by affidavit. 
The foregoing cases and the Agreement provide ample justification for this Court to 
award Appellants their fees and costs incurred on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
On both Issue No. 1 and 2, the trial court failed to support with findings of fact its 
reduction and denial of attorney fees. Therefore, this Court should find that the trial court 
was in error when it reduced the amount of attorney fees sought by Appellants in the 
primary phase of the litigation and when it denied attorney fees and costs in the post-
judgment, collection phase. In addition, an examination and analysis of all evidence in 
the record yields no support for any reduction in the amount or denial of attorney fees. 
Further, based on the trial court's Final Order and Judgment that Appellants' attorney fees 
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are reasonable, this Court should direct the trial court to enter an augmented judgment in 
the amount of $5,488 ($11,538 minus $6,050 awarded), plus accrued interest from 
Febraary 1, 2002, the date of entry of the original judgment. And, this Court should also 
direct the trial court to enter an additional judgment in the amount of $2,107 for the fees 
and costs incurred while collecting the initial Judgment. Finally, this Court should also 
award Appellants their attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
DATED this 22nd day of September 2003. 
Michael A. Jensen ( 
Counsel for Appellaiits 
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Defendants. 
FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT 




Case No. 000906072 
Judge L.A. Dever 
The Court, having reviewed Defendants' Motions and Memoranda for Summary 
Judgment on the Second, Third and Fourth Causes of Action and also having reviewed 
Plaintiffs' memoranda in opposition, and after hearing on November 30, 2001, at which 
all parties were represented by counsel and where Plaintiffs' counsel stipulated to 
dismissing Plaintiffs' Second and Fourth Causes of Action, now makes the following 
conclusions: 
JD 
1. After applying the test as set forth in Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass yn, 
907 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995), the Court finds that Paragraph 3.2.b. of the Settlement 
Agreement, which forms the subject matter for Plaintiffs' Third Cause Action, is 
unambiguous. 
2. The Settlement Agreement provides that Mr. Blevins use his best business 
judgment in negotiating and settling the Clean Gas Receivable claimuand that Mr. Blevins 
admittedly did or should have used his best business judgment in accepting the amount 
from Clean Ga3 on the Clean Gas Receivable claim. As a consoquoncoffhere was and is 
no offset as contemplated within the Settlement Agreement to support Plaintiffs5 claim. 
Further, there was and is no breach of Defendants' duty to act with good faith and fair 
dealing. 
3. Consistent with the Court's interpretation of the Settlement Agreement, 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the Third Cause of Action should be 
granted. 
4. Since the Settlement Agreement expressly provides for attorney fees to the 
prevailing party, Defendants are determined to be the prevailing party and are therefore 
entitled to reasonable attorney fees. 
Sinus Mi. Blevins used his best business judgment when he accepted the amount 
paid by Clean Ga3, the Court finds that there is no need to consider whether Mr. Blevins' 
affidavit testimony is hearsay. Accordingly, the Court declines to rule on Defendants' 
The Court, having previously granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on 
the First Cause of Action and now by granting summary judgment on all remaining 
causes of action, and after reviewing the affidavit of attorney fees submitted by 
Defendants and finding such fees to be reasonable, orders and 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs' Motions for 
Summary Judgment on the Second, Third and Fourth Causes of Action be granted and 
that Plaintiffs' Complaint be dismissed,in ito entirety with projudico and on ito morifa. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants be awarded their reasonable 
attorney fees in the amount of $ 
AGREED AS TO FORM: 
Ronald L. Dunn 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Custom\Order3 Final Order Judgment December 7, 2001 ~i ~ 
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STEVEN BLEVINS AND 
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, 
INC., ET AL 
Defendants. 
AMENDED AFFIDAVIT OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
(MICHAEL A. JENSEN) 
Case No. 000906072 
Judge L.A. Dever 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Michael A. Jensen, being duly sworn, depose and state as follows: 
1. I am over the age of twenty-one years, and I am competent to provide the 
information, under oath, that is contained in this Affidavit. This information is based on 
my personal knowledge. If called upon to testify in a court of law, I could, and would, 
testify the same as I have stated herein. 
2. I am legal counsel to Defendants in the above-entitled action. 
3
 Filed & Served 12/26/2001 
3. Since the commencement of this action, I have been providing legal services 
for Defendants in connection with all phases of litigation in the above entitled action. 
4. I have personally spent more than 76.4 hours representing Defendants in this 
action, some of which were not billed. The Court previously awarded attorney fees for 
my time in dismissing three of the initial Defendants. The number of hours attributable 
for that award was 7.6 hours. My hourly rate was $175 when this matter first began but it 
increased to $185 per hour effective September 1, 2001, for a blended hourly rate of $177 
during the entire litigation. After deducting for the 7.6 hours of time previously awarded 
by the Court, the resultant number of hours expended in this litigation is 64.9 hours. At 
the blended rate of $177, the total attorney fees for this litigation is $11,538. 
5. I believe that the hourly rate charged by me is reasonable and comparable to 
those charged by other attorneys with similar experience and for similar litigation 
activities. 
6. I believe that the time I spent was reasonable under all of the circumstances. 
The legal issues raised were such that reasonable research and writing were required to 
bring about the dismissal of all four causes of action contained in Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
Plaintiffs' Complaint was essentially frivolous and without merit. For example, I had to 
review litigation in a previous bankruptcy case in which one of the Defendants in this 
case allegedly had not relinquished certain funds to Plaintiffs. In response to that 
allegation, I obtained the affidavit of another attorney, Richard Perkins, including various 
supporting documents from the bankruptcy case. I then filed a motion for summary 
judgment on the First Cause of Action. After filing that motion, Plaintiffs filed a "non-
opposition" and the First Cause of Action was dismissed. 
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A second motion for summary judgment was filed on the Second Cause of Action, 
but in that instance, Plaintiffs filed an opposition memorandum, although extremely weak 
in nature and content. At hearing on November 30, 2001, Plaintiffs conceded dismissal 
of their Second Cause of Action. 
After a scheduling conference and two sets of written discovery on Plaintiffs and 
after responding to written discovery requests from Plaintiffs, I filed a third motion for 
summary judgment on the Third and Fourth Causes of Action. Plaintiffs responded 
vigorously in opposition to the Third Cause of Action and also filed a cross-motion for 
summary judgment. After scheduling and rescheduling by the Court, a hearing was held 
on November 30, 2001. At hearing, Plaintiffs conceded dismissal of their Fourth Cause 
of Action, but they vigorously, and I believe unreasonably, defended against summary 
judgment on their Third Cause of Action. Nonetheless, the Court granted summary 
judgement on all remaining causes of action and dismissed Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
7. This Amended Affidavit is for the sole purpose of adding 6.4 hours for research 
and drafting a Response to Plaintiffs' Objections and to update and prepare this affidavit. 
DATED this 26th day of December 2001. 
Michael A. Jensen 
On the 26th day of December 2001, personally appeared before me, 
Michael A. Jensen, the signer of the within Affidavit, who acknowledged to me that he 
did execute the same and that the contents thereof are true, accurate and complete to the 
best of his information and belief. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Q 2 v^aT-S&v Notary Public i 
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136 Souin Main, Ste. 318 I 
SaHLake City, Utah 84101 -
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I, Michael A. Jensen, Counsel for Defendants, hereby certify that on this day I 
personally served the foregoing AMENDED AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
(MICHAEL A. JENSEN) by personally mailing a copy to: 
Ronald L. Dunn 
Attorney at Law 
68 South Main, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
(801) 521-3800; Fax: 537-1315 
DATED this 26th day of December 2001. 
MICHAEL A. JE 
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STEVEN BLEVINS AND 
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, 
INC., ET AL 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES (MICHAEL A. JENSEN) 
Case No. 000906072 
Judge L.A. Dever 
STATE OF UTAH 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Michael A. Jensen, being duly sworn, depose and state as follows: 
1. I am over the age of twenty-one years, and I am competent to provide the 
information, under oath, that is contained in this Affidavit. This information is based on 
my personal knowledge. If called upon to testify in a court of law, I could, and would, 
testify the same as I have stated herein. 
2. I am legal counsel to Defendants in the above-entitled action. 
3. Since the commencement of this action, I have been providing legal services 
for Defendants in connection with all phases of litigation in the above entitled action. 
4. I have personally spent more than 70 hours representing Defendants in this 
action, some of which were not billed. The Court previously awarded attorney fees for 
my time in dismissing three of the initial Defendants. The number of hours attributable 
for that award was 7.6 hours. My hourly rate was $175 when this matter first began but it 
increased to $185 per hour effective September 1, 2001, for a blended hourly rate of $177 
during the entire litigation. After deducting for the 7.6 hours of time previously awarded 
by the Court, the resultant number of hours expended in this litigation is 58.5 hours. At 
the blended rate of $177, the total attorney fees for this litigation is $10,354. 
5. I believe that the hourly rate charged by me is reasonable and comparable to 
those charged by other attorneys with similar experience and for similar litigation 
activities. 
6. I believe that the time I spent was reasonable under all of the circumstances. 
The legal issues raised were such that reasonable research and writing were required to 
bring about the dismissal of all four causes of action contained in Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
Plaintiffs' Complaint was essentially frivolous and without merit. For example, I had to 
review litigation in a previous bankruptcy case in which one of the Defendants in this 
case allegedly had not relinquished certain funds to Plaintiffs. In response to that 
allegation, I obtained the affidavit of another attorney, Richard Perkins, including various 
supporting documents from the bankruptcy case. I then filed a motion for summary 
judgment on the First Cause of Action. After filing that motion, Plaintiffs filed a "non-
opposition" and the First Cause of Action was dismissed. 
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A second motion for summary judgment was filed on the Second Cause of Action, 
but in that instance, Plaintiffs filed an opposition memorandum, although extremely weak 
in nature and content. At hearing on November 30, 2001, Plaintiffs conceded dismissal 
of their Second Cause of Action. 
After a scheduling conference and two sets of written discovery on Plaintiffs and 
after responding to written discovery requests from Plaintiffs, I filed a third motion for 
summary judgment on the Third and Fourth Causes of Action. Plaintiffs responded 
vigorously in opposition to the Third Cause of Action and also filed a cross-motion for 
summary judgment. After scheduling and rescheduling by the Court, a hearing was held 
on November 30, 2001. At hearing, Plaintiffs conceded dismissal of their Fourth Cause 
of Action, but they vigorously, and I believe unreasonably, defended against summary 
judgment on their Third Cause of Action. Nonetheless, the Court granted summary 
judgement on all remaining causes of action and dismissed Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
7. I have attached hereto my billing records in this matter. 
DATED this 3rd day of December 2001. 
Michael A. Jensen f J 
On the 3rd day of December 2001, personally appeared before me, 
Michael A. Jensen, the signer of the within Affidavit, who acknowledged to me that he 
did execute the same and that the contents thereof are true, accurate and complete to the 
best of his information and belief. 
Custom\Blevins3\Jensen Aff2 Fees December 3, 2001 5 
CERTIFICATION 
Case No. 000906072 
Judge L.A. Dever 
STEVEN BLEVINS AND 
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS, Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, INC., ET AL, Defendants. 
I, Michael A. Jensen, Counsel for Defendants, hereby certify that on this day I 
personally served the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
(MICHAEL A. JENSEN) by personally delivering a copy to: 
Ronald L. Dunn 
Attorney at Law 
68 South Main, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
(801) 521-3800; Fax: 537-1315 
DATED this 7th day of December 2001. 
MICHAEL A. JENI 




Michael A. Jensen 
Slip Listing Page 1 
Selection Criteria 
Slip.Classification Open 
Client (hand select) Include: Custom3 Blevins 
Slip.Transaction Ty 1-1 
Rate Info - identifies rate source and level 
Slip ID 





Billed G:12145 10/31/00 




Billed G:12145 10/31/00 




Billed G:12145 10/31/00 
Litigation: telephone conversation with 
Client re representation. 
9140 TIME 
10/19/00 
Billed G:12145 10/31/00 
Litigation: draft Motion to Dismiss, Motion 
to Strike portions of Complaint, and 
Motion for a More Definite Statement. 
9155 TIME 
10/30/00 
Billed G:12145 10/31/00 




Billed G:12193 11/30/00 
Litigation: telephone conversation with 
Richard Perkins re trust funds held by him 
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Michael A Jensen 
Slip Listing Page 2 
Slip ID 





Billed G12193 11/30/00 
Litigation review dates of memoranda 
filed on motion to dismiss, draft, file, and 
mail Notice to Submit for Decision on 

























Billed G12193 11/30/00 
Litigation file, draft, and mail Notice to 
Submit for Decision on Motion to Dismiss 
and to Strike 
9607 TIME 
01/15/01 
Billed G12373 03/31/01 
Litigation telephone conversation with 




Billed G12373 03/31/01 
Litigation read and review revisions 
requested by Perkins for his affidavit, edit 
and revise affidavit, draft letter and fax to 
Perkins with revision and redlined version 
and requesting signing to be this week 
9611 TIME 
01/30/01 
Billed G12373 03/31/01 
Litigation meet with Richard Perkins at 
his office to discuss affidavit and have him 
sign it and obtain good copies of exhibits 
to attach to affidavit 
9646 TIME 
02/06/01 
Billed G 12373 03/31/01 
Litigation draft, file, and serve Notice to 
Submit for Decision on Motion to Dismiss, 
draft, file, and serve Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment on First Cause of 
Action, draft, file, and serve Memorandum 
in Support of Motion for same, finalize 





















































Michael A. Jensen 
Slip Listing Page 3 
Slip ID 
Dates and Time 
Posting Status 
Description 
Perkins with Memorandum for SJ. 
9955 TIME 
04/09/01 
Billed G:12426 04/30/01 








Judge Dever's law clerk, Ray, re status of 



























Litigation: review Minute Entry of Judge 
Dever; draft proposed Order and 
Judgment based on Minute Entry; draft 
Motion and Memorandum for Attorney 
Fees; review billing records and draft 






Billed G:12426 04/30/01 
Guardianship and/or Conservatorship 
Activities: arrange for deliver of 












9979 TIME Jensen 
04/11/01 Litigation 
Billed G:12426 04/30/01 Custom3 Blevins 
Litigation: draft Answer to Complaint; draft 
First Discovery interrogatories, requests, 




Billed G:12426 04/30/01 
Litigation: receive and read Objection to 
Form of Order; research issues of "with 
prejudice" and "on the merits;" draft 
Alternative Order; draft, file, and mail 
Defendants' Objection to Objection; draft 
Amended Motion for Attorney Fees; draft 





















Michael A. Jensen 
Slip Listing Page 4 
Slip ID 





Billed G:12426 04/30/01 
Litigation: read and review motions and 
memoranda from Dunn. 
10138 TIME 
05/05/01 
Billed G:12496 05/31/01 
Litigation: draft response to Second 
Objection to form of Order and request for 
attorney fees; draft Second Amended 
Motion for Attorney Fees; draft Second 



































Billed G:12496 05/31/01 
Litigation: draft Memorandum in 
Opposition to Rule 59 Motion. 
10140 TIME 
05/07/01 
Billed G:12496 05/31/01 
Litigation: draft and file at Court Notice to 
Submit on Form of Order, Memorandum 
in Opposition, Reponse to Second 
Objection, 2nd Amended Motion for 
Attorney Fees, and 2nd Amended 






















10229 TIME Jensen 
05/21/01 Litigation 
Billed G.12496 05/31/01 Custom3 Blevins 
Litigation: draft and file Reply to 
Response to Second Amended Motion for 
Attorney Fees. 
10231 TIME Jensen 
05/22/01 Litigation 
Billed G:12496 05/31/01 Custom3 Blevins 














Blevins; review responses to Requests for 
Admissions; draft, file and serve Motion 
and Memorandum in Support of Partial 
Summary Judgment on Second Cause of 
Action; read and review first discovery 
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Slip Listing Page 5 
Slip ID 





Billed G:12496 05/31/01 








Memorandum; draft, file, and serve Notice 
to Submit for Decision. 
10359 TIME 
06/19/01 
Billed G:12531 06/30/01 
Litigation: telephone conversation with 
Client re Discovery Requests from 




Billed G:12531 06/30/01 
Litigation: Telephone conference with 
Judge Dever and Dunn re schedule to 





































10365 TIME Jensen 
06/21/01 Litigation 
Billed G:12531 06/30/01 Custom3 Blevins 
Litigation: review responses to Discovery 
from Clients; telephone conversation with 
Clients re same; draft formal Answers and 
Responses and priority mail to Clients for 










Billed G:12531 06/30/01 
Litigation: receive completed signature 
page faxed from Clients; edit and revise 




Billed G:12571 07/31/01 
Litigation: review discovery responses 
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Slip ID 





Billed G:12627 08/31/01 
Litigation: receive and read responses to 
second discovery requests. 
10650 TIME 
08/23/01 
Billed G:12627 08/31/01 
Litigation: begin drafting Memorandum in 
Opposition to Summary Judgment. 
10651 TIME 
08/24/01 
Billed G:12627 08/31/01 
Litigation: draft and mail affidavits to 
Clients; research issues of hearsay in 
affidavits and accord and satisfaction as it 
relates to interest; draft Motion and 




Billed G:12627 08/31/01 
Litigation: draft Motion and Memorandum 
in Support of Summary Judgment on 3rd 
and 4th Causes of Action; telephone 
conversation with Client re affidavits and 





















































10667 TIME Jensen 
08/29/01 Litigation 
Billed G:12627 08/31/01 Custom3 Blevins 
Litigation: telephone conversation with 
Client re case and re affidavit; file Motion 
and Memorandum for Summary 









10668 TIME Jensen 
08/30/01 Litigation 
Billed G:12627 08/31/01 Custom3 Blevins 
Litigation: edit and revise Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion for Summary 












Michael A. Jensen 
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Slip ID 





Billed G:12666 09/30/01 
Litigation: receive and review Notice to 
Submit on Summary Judgment; telephone 
conversation with Court; review Court's 
Docket; draft and fax letter to Dunn; draft 























10775 TIME Jensen 
09/19/01 Litigation 
Billed G:12666 09/30/01 Custom3 Blevins 
Litigation: review Dunn's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on 3rd and 4th Causes of 
Action; draft Reply Memorandum on 
same Motion; draft Notice to Submit for 
Decision; review Dunn's Memo in 
Opposition to Motion to Strike Hearsay 
Testimony of Steven Blevins; research 
Rules of Evidence on Hearsay and 
exceptions; draft Reply Memorandum on 
same Motion; draft Notice to Submit for 
Decision on Motion; draft Request for 
Hearing on October 30th, date set for 








10847 TIME Jensen 
10/05/01 Litigation 
Billed G:12707 10/31/01 Custom3 Blevins 
Litigation: meet with Judge Dever's Clerk 
re pending motions and need to 
consolidate hearing on all such motions. 
10887 TIME 
10/10/01 
Billed G:12707 10/31/01 
Guardianship and/or Conservatorship 
Activities: meet with Judge Dever's Clerk 
re Request to Hear all Motions and 
confirm with her that all motions will be 
heard on October 30th, subject to any 
delay caused by extensive jury trial 
currently underway. 
Jensen 















10908 TIME Jensen 
10/16/01 Litigation 
Billed G:12707 10/31/01 Custom3 Blevins 
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Slip Listing Page 8 
Slip ID 
Dates and Time 
Posting Status 
Description 




Litigation: meet with Judge Dover's clerk 
re schedule for hearing; draft, file and 


































Litigation: review case file and court's 
docket; draft and file Amended 
Withdrawal of Motion for Continuance; 
review Reply Affidavit of Blevins; draft and 
file Amended Motion to Strike to include 







Litigation: organize and select documents 
to include as courtesy copies in a binder 





Litigation: prepare for and attending 
hearing on Motions for Summary 





Litigation: obtain copy of Court's docket 
and review entries; select from TimeSlips 
all entries for this case, excluding all costs 
and expenses; draft Affidavit of Attorney's 


































Michael A. Jensen 
Slip Listing Page 9 
User Units Rate Slip Value 
Activity DNB Time Rate Info 
Client Est. Time Bill Status 
Reference Variance 
Billable 66.10 11693.50 
Unbillable 0.00 0.00 
Total 66.10 11693.50 
^55 Jr^L ^ ^ 
w^-i. 
Tab 4 
RONALD L. DUNN, ESQ. - 4312 
RONALD L. DUNN, P.C. 
68 South Main, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone (801) 521-3800 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 




CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, INC., 
et al, 
Defendants. 
OBJECTION TO PROPOSED ORDER 
AND OBJECTION TO ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND DEMAND FOR 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
Case No. 000906072-CN 
Honorable Judge Dever 
District Judge 
The Plaintiffs, Steven C. Blevins and Debra Kay Blevins (the "Blevins"), by and 
through their attorney and pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-501, UCJA, hereby submit 
their objection to the proposed Final Order and Judgment and accompanying Attorney's Fees 
Affidavit. Moreover, the Plaintiffs demand an evidentiary hearing on the attorney's fees 
claims of counsel for Defendants. 
FACTS 
1. The Plaintiffs commenced this proceeding alleging various breaches of a Global 
Settlement Agreement by all Defendants (the "Isaacson"). Those breaches included: 
a. Failing to direct funds held by counsel to be paid to a bankruptcy trustee; 
b. Failing to redeem certain personalty in a timely fashion; and 
pf 
c. Failing to indemnify against offsets claimed by the Plaintiffs' payor, and 
otherwise failing to perform the duties of good faith and fair dealing. 
2. Three of the Isaacsons had previously commenced a proceeding against the 
Plaintiffs, seeking under $11 in interest and nearly $7,000 in attorney's fees incurred in a third 
party proceeding, defending a prejudgment garnishment of $6,667 payable by a third party. 
3. A deadline was set in that earlier proceeding for amending pleadings and bringing in 
other parties: the Plaintiffs missed that deadline, and thus filed the instant proceeding. 
4. The Plaintiffs moved Judge Peuler in the earlier proceeding to consolidate this 
proceeding with the earlier one, but she refused. 
5. Thereupon, the three of the Isaacsons that were plaintiffs in the earlier proceeding 
moved successfully to have the claims against them herein dismissed, and the Court awarded 
$1,330 in attorney's fees to them. 
6. Upon the Isaacsons' demonstrating that the funds payable to the bankruptcy trustee 
were paid before the effective date of the Global Settlement Agreement, the Plaintiffs informed 
the Isaacsons' counsel that they would stipulate to dismissal of the cause of action related to 
that alleged breach. 
7. Upon receipt of a ruling by Judge Peuler in the prior proceeding that claims based 
upon the untimely redemption of certain personalty were unripe, the Plaintiffs informed the 
Isaacsons' counsel that they would stipulate to dismissal of the cause of action related to that 
alleged breach, without prejudice. 
2 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Proposed Order of Judgment, 
The Plaintiffs object to the dismissal "with prejudice and on the merits" of their Second 
Cause of Action, regarding alleged breaches of a duty to redeem certain personalty in a timely 
fashion and, thus, obviate or at least limit storage costs being incurred for which the Plaintiffs 
might be responsible. Judge Peuler ruled in the earlier proceeding that claims by the three 
dismissed defendants herein based upon the same personalty were unripe, as the storage 
company had not made any claim upon any party for unpaid storage charges. 
Based upon that ruling of unripeness, the Plaintiffs consented to dismissal of the second 
cause of action. The dismissal should not be "with prejudice and on the merits," as the statute 
of limitations on the claim for alleged unpaid storage charges has not yet run. 
B. The Isaacsons' Claim for Attorney's Fees is Excessive. 
1. The Total Amount of Fees Charged for Defending this Proceeding is Too High. 
This is for several reasons, set forth in the accompanying affidavit. 
a. Three of the Four Causes of Action Were Uncontested. As set forth in the facts, 
above, dismissal of two of the four causes of action were not contested, either before or after 
die filing of separate motions for partial summary judgment. The fourth cause of action, 
against John Does unidentified by the deadline for doing so, was also the subject of an 
unnecessary motion for partial summary judgment. Thus only the third claim was actually 
litigated. 
3 
b. There Was Limited Discovery. Discovery consisted only of three sets of written 
discovery requests: two by the Isaacsons and one by the Plaintiffs. 
c. The Amount in Controversy Makes the Total Fees Sought Unreasonable, The 
Isaacsons presently seek $10,354 in fees. The dismissed defendants were awarded $1,330, 
making a total of $11,684 in fees sought on a matter in which the only cause of action that was 
contested was for about $6,000 plus interest [per complaint] and $6,830 [$10,245 x 2/3 per 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment] plus interest. 
The accompanying affidavit states the total fee should not be for more than about 50% 
of the amount sought or defended against in a commercial case having no significant legal or 
constitutional issues. 
2. Rates are Too High. The Isaacsons' counsel was admitted to the bar in about 
October 1995, yet his rates, $175 and $185 per hour in this proceeding, are the rates charged 
that would be chargeable by an attorney having a much longer acquaintanceship with the 
practice of law. Moreover, throughout this proceeding the Isaacsons' counsel has been 
practicing out of a home office, which makes his overhead costs smaller, and thus a smaller 
hourly fee is appropriate. 
4 
Tab 5 
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RONALD L. DUNN (#A4312) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
36 South Main Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3800 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 




CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, INC. 
a Utah corporation, CONTRACTING 
FABRICATION MACHINING, INC., 
a dissolved Utah corporation, RANDY 
ISAACSON, LINDA I. ISAACSON, 
HEIDI BISHOP, JASON BISHOP, 
WENDY GARAMENDI, and MARK 
GARAMENDI, and JOHN DOES I-X, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF R. BRENT STEPHENS 
Case No 000906072-CN 
Judge L. A. Dever 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss. 
) 
R BRENT STEPHENS, after being duly sworn, depose and state as follows: 
1. I am an attorney and have been a member of the Utah State Bar since 1973 
2. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein, and am competent to attest 
thereto. 
3. I have practiced continuously with the law firm of Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
since 1973, in the area of litigation and, in particular, complex commercial litigation, commercial 
litigation, contracts, antitrust, securities, and other commercial litigation matters. 
4. I have litigated attorneys' fees provisions relating to what are reasonable attorneys' 
fees, and have knowledge of reasonable attorneys' fees in the context of what is a reasonable 
attorney's fee in connection with a contractual provision providing attorney's fees to a prevailing 
party in a contract action. 
5. A reasonable attorney's fee governed by the Rules of Professional Conduct, as it 
relates to this context and, in my opinion, requires the following factors to be considered: 
a. The time and labor required; 
b. The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill requisite to 
perform the legal service properly; 
c. The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; 
d. The amount involved and the results obtained; 
e. The experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the 
services; and 
f. Other relevant factors that may be related to what determines a reasonable fee 
under the context of the Rules of Professional Conduct adopted by the Utah 
Supreme Court in this locality. 
-2- u 
6. The attorneys' fees reasonably awarded should relate to specifically, in this 
context, most notably the time and labor required, the amount involved, and the results obtained. 
7. I have spent approximately one hour reviewing the case with counsel for 
Mr. Blevins, in reviewing the circumstances of what may constitute a reasonable fee in the context 
of this litigation. 
8. I have also spent approximately an hour discussing the matter with Mr. Blevins. 
9. I am informed that the amount in controversy relating to the fee imposed 
approximated $7,000.00. It is my further understanding that the amount of the fees requested 
pursuant to the contractual provision for the amount in controversy is in the amount of 
$10,354.00. 
10. Based upon my review of the facts of the case as previously indicated, discussions 
with counsel, discussions with counsel's client, and a review of the controversy, it is my opinion 
that a requested fee of $10,354.00 is excessive pursuant to the factors required to be considered 
as to what constitutes a reasonable fee under the Rules of Professional Conduct as to the amount 
involved, the results obtained, the experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer performing the 
services, and other factors relating to what constitutes a reasonable fee. 
11. Under the facts of this case as I understand them, based upon my review of the file 
and my discussions with counsel and his client, the attorney's fees requested should certainly not 
exceed the amount in controversy, and in my opinion, should be some percentage less than the 
amount in controversy absent other and exigent circumstances (such as constitutional rights), but 
certainly not in the context of a controversy involving trade or commerce, and suits under 
commercial contracts. 
3
" M s n 
12. It has been my experience that reasonable fees would not exceed fifty percent of 
the amount in controversy, as the facts have been explained to me in this type of case as explained 
to me as previously noted. 
Further affiant saith not. 
DATED this tf~ day of December, 2001. 
R. Brent Stephens 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this / / ^ d a y of December, 2001. 







Margo D. Colegrove 
10 Exchange PK • PO Box 45000 
Salt Lake City. UT 84145-5000 
My Commission Expires 
February 17, 2003 
STATE OF UTAH 
-4- My** 
Tab 6 
MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231) 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 571708 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-1708 
(801) 519-9040; Fax: 519-9264 
Counsel for Defendants 
Filed & Served 04/12/2002 
m Y C! E'X.i 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
450 South State Street 
PO Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1860 
Clerk: 238-7480; In-Court Clerk: 238-7464/77325 (Kathy/Debbie/Bryce) S35 
STEVEN BLEVINS AND 
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RANDY ISAACSON, LINDA 
ISAACSON, WENDY GARAMENDI, 
AND JASON BISHOP, 
Defendants. 
MOTION TO AUGMENT 
JUDGMENT 
HEARING REQUESTED 
Case No. 000906072 
Judge L.A. Dever 
Defendants Creditors, by and through counsel, hereby request the Court to augment 
the Judgment entered in this case on February 1, 2002. Based on the same contract 
provisions which permitted the Court to award fees and costs to Defendants, Defendants 
are now entitled to augment the original Judgment of $6,050 by the fees and costs 
incurred so far in attempting to collect such Judgment. Supported by the attached 
affidavit, additional fees and costs amount to $2,107. Defendants, therefore, request the 
Court to enter a second judgment against Plaintiffs in the amount of $2,107. 
Defendants believe that Plaintiffs may become more cooperative if the Court enters 
the requested judgment; Plaintiffs are particularly stubborn and vexatious. 
DATED this 12th day of April 2002. 
Michael A. Jensen 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Case No. 000906072 
Judge L.A. Dever 
STEVEN BLEVINS AND 
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS, Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RANDY ISAACSON, ET AL, Defendants. 
I, Michael A. Jensen, hereby certify that on this day I personally served the 
foregoing MOTION TO AUGMENT JUDGMENT by delivering a copy to: 
Ronald L. Dunn 
Attorney at Law 
68 South Main, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
(801) 521-3800; Fax: 537-1315 
DATED this 12th day of April 2002. 
Custom\Blevins3\Motion8 Augment Judgment April 12,2002 2 
Tab 7 
MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231) 
Attorney at Law 
730 Three Fountains #87 
PO Box 571708 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-1708 
(801) 519-9040; Fax: 519-9264 
Filed & Served 04/12/2002 
po r c j j o «" p . ' 
•-L7L.'..vSDFPAr.HLM~ 
Counsel for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
450 South State Street 
PO Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1860 
Clerk. 238-7480; In-Court Clerk. 238-7464/77325 (Audrey/Debbie/Bryce) W37 
STEVEN BLEVINS AND 
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RANDY ISAACSON, LINDA 
ISAACSON, WENDY GARAMENDI, 
AND JASON BISHOP, 
Defendants. 
FIRST AFFIDAVIT OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
RELATING TO THE COLLECTION 
OF JUDGMENT 
Case No. 000906072 
Judge L.A. Dever 
STATE OF UTAH 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Michael A. Jensen, being duly sworn, depose and state as follows: 
1. I am over the age of twenty-one years, and I am competent to provide the 
information, under oath, that is contained in this Affidavit. This information is based on 
my personal knowledge. If called upon to testify in a court of law, I could, and would, 
testify the same as I have stated herein. 
2. I am legal counsel to Defendants in the above-entitled action. 
3. Since the commencement of this action, I have been providing legal services 
for Defendants in connection with all phases of litigation in the above entitled action, 
including all efforts to collect on a judgment entered in favor of Defendants and against 
Plaintiffs. 
4. I have personally spent more than 10.0 hours in attempting to collect the 
Judgment amount of $6,050. In addition, costs were incurred in the amount of $72. The 
amount of time includes the preparation of this affidavit and the accompanying Motion to 
Augment Judgment. In addition, I expect to spend at least one additional hour at the 
hearing set on Plaintiffs' motion on Friday, April 12, 2002. Combined, my total hours in 
collection and related matters are 11.0 hours. At my standard billing rate of $ 185 per 
hour, total fees so far in the collection process are $2,035. Adding to that the above costs 
(service of process and garnishment fees) of $72, the total amount is $2,107. 
5. I believe that the hourly rate charged by me is reasonable and comparable to 
those charged by other attorneys with similar experience and for similar litigation 
activities. 
6. I believe that the time I spent was reasonable under all of the circumstances. 
The judgment debtors have vigorously and unreasonably avoided payment and thwarted 
were possible all attempts to collect on the Judgment. Defendant Steven Blevins failed to 
appear at a Supplemental Proceeding and the Court entered a Bench Warrant, pending the 
outcome of the hearing referenced above. Plaintiffs have also filed a Motion to Quash all 
- 2 -
supplemental proceedings and have even served discovery requests on Defendants. I 
have had to respond to each of these items. The judgment debtors are solely responsible 
for all of these additional legal fees and costs. 
7. This First Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Costs Relating to the Collection of 
Judgment is for the sole purpose of awarding to Defendants the additional fees and costs 
incurred by Plaintiffs1 intransigence. 
DATED this 12th day of April 2002. 
Michael A. Jensen ( 7 
On the 12th day of April 2002, personally appeared before me, Michael A. Jensen, 
the signer of the within Affidavit, who acknowledged to me that he did execute the same 
and that the contents thereof are true, accurate and complete to the best of his information 
and belief. 
Custom\Blevins3\Jensen Affl Collection Fees Apnl 12, 2002 " 3 
CERTIFICATION 
Case No. 000906072 
Judge L.A. Dever 
STEVEN BLEVINS AND 
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS, Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, INC., ET AL, Defendants. 
I, Michael A. Jensen, Counsel for Defendants, hereby certify that on this day I 
personally served the foregoing FIRST AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND 
COSTS RELATING TO THE COLLECTION OF JUDGMENT by personally 
delivering a copy to: 
Ronald L. Dunn 
Attorney at Law 
68 South Main, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
(801) 521-3800; Fax: 537-1315 
DATED this 12th day of April 2002. 
MICHAEL A. JE 
Custom\Blevms3\Jensen Affl Collection Fees April 12,2002 _4_ 
04/11/02 
2:10 PM 
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Rate Info - identifies rate source and level 
Slip ID 






Collection Activities: obtain Court's 
Order and Judgment; draft and file 
Judgment Information; draft Supple 



































Collection Expenses: Process Server to 





Collection Activities: review fax letter and 
telephone message from Dunn requesting 
continuance of Supp Proceeding; draft 
and fax letter to Dunn re same; telephone 












11618 TIME Jensen 
03/19/02 Collections 
WIP Custom3 Blevins 
Collection Activities: telephone call from 
Dunn re second change to Supplemental 
Proceeding. 
11664 TIME Jensen 
03/28/02 Collections 
WIP Custom3 Blevins 














to quash supplemental order; draft 




Michael A. Jensen 
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Litigation: edit and revise Memorandum; 
file Memorandum in Opposition 








































Proceeding; meet with Judge Medley; 
attempt to meet with Judge Dever's 
clerks; meet with Larry Gobelman re 








Collection Activities: telephone 
conversation with Judge Dever's clerk to 
schedule a hearing on Motion to Quash; 
draft, file, and serve Notice of Hearing; 
review Dunn's postjudgment discovery 
requests; research issue of postjudgment 
discovery; confer by telephone with a 
retired judge on the issue; draft, file and 




















Collection Activities: Litigation: telephone 





Collection Activities: telephone call from 
Custom's Bankruptcy attorney in Idaho re 
hearing and appearance of Blevins; 
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Slip Listing Page 3 
Slip ID 



















Collection Activities: receive and review 
Notice of Plaintiffs' Supersedeas Bond 
faxed to me by Dunn; review Rule 62 re 
stays and supersedeas bonds; draft 
Motion for Augmented Judgment, 
including an Affidavit of Attorney Fees 
and Costs; file same with Court; Draft 
Bench Warrant consistent with Court's 















Collection Expenses: Service of Process 

















MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231) 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 571708 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-1708 
(801) 519-9040; Fax: 519-9264 
Counsel for Defendants 
2>f 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
450 South State Street 
PO Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1860 
Clerk 238-7480, In-Court Clerk 238-7464/77325 (Kathy/Debbie/Bryce) S35 
STEVEN BLEVINS AND 
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, 
INC., ET AL 
Defendants. 
DENIAL OF FIRST ORDER AND 
JUDGMENT TO AUGMENT 
ORIGINAL JUDGMENT 
Case No. 000906072 
Judge L.A. Dever 
The Court, having reviewed Defendants' Motion to Augment Judgment and its 
supporting Affidavit of Attorney Fees, and finding w opposition to the motion, denies the Jh 
Motion &»4^^tsAA 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that no additional judgment be 
rN>Tw j ^ W \ N b ^ MX^^V^SVV^K . 
entered against Plaintiffs m favor of Defendants in the amount of $2,107. 
DATED this Q2* day o f ^ ^ ^ j v -
Jud| 
Third Distinct Court Judge 
Custom\Blevms3\Order to Augment Judgment April 30, 2002 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Case No. 000906072 
Judge L.A. Dever 
STEVEN BLEVINS AND 
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS, Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, INC., ET AL, Defendants. 
I, Michael A. Jensen, hereby certify that on this day I personally served the 
foregoing DENIAL OF FIRST ORDER AND JUDGMENT TO AUGMENT 
ORIGINAL JUDGMENT by mailing a copy to: 
Ronald L. Dunn 
Attorney at Law 
68 South Main, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
(801) 521-3800; Fax: 537-1315 
DATED this 25th day of July 2002. 
MICHAEL A. JENS|sj/, Esq. 
Custom\Blevins3\Order to Augment Judgment April 30,2002 2 
Tab 9 
RONALD L. DUNN, ESQ. - 4312 
RONALD L. DUNN, P.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
68 South Main, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3800 
Qds 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 




CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, INC., 
a Utah corporation, CONTRACTING 
FABRICATION MACHINING, INC., a 
dissolved Utah corporation, RANDY 
ISAACSON, LINDA I. ISAACSON, 
HEIDI BISHOP, JASON BISHOP, 
WENDY GARAMENDI, and MARK 
GARAMENDI, and JOHN DOES I-X 
I Defendants. | 
OBJECTION TO FORM OF ORDER AND 
NOTICE TO SUBMIT RE 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
AUGMENT JUDGMENT 
Case No. 000906072-CN 
Honorable Judge Dever 
District Judge 
The Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel and pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-501, 
UCJA, hereby submit to the Court their objection to both the notice to submit and the form of 
order on Defendants' Motion to Augment Judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Notice to Submit, 
Notwithstanding the Defendants' representation that "[n]o opposition memorandum has 
been filed, one has been filed, a true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A". 
B. The Order. 
Since the Court has not yet ruled on the Defendants' motion and determined the 
reasonableness of fees, the recitals "finding no opposition to the motion" and "finding that such 
fees are reasonable under all the circumstances" are incorrect. Moreover, since there is not yet 
a finding of reasonableness, the inclusion of the amount, $2,107, is inappropriate. 
DATED May 3, 2002, 
Ronald L. Dunn, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on May 3, 2002, I deposited in the United States Mails, postage prepaid, 
copies of the above-described document and this Certificate, addressed to: 
Michael A. Jensen, Esq. 
2 
RONALD L. DUNN, ESQ. - 4312 
RONALD L. DUNN, P.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
68 South Main, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3800 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 




CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, INC., 
a Utah corporation, CONTRACTING 
FABRICATION MACHINING, INC., a 
dissolved Utah corporation, RANDY 
ISAACSON, LINDA I. ISAACSON, 
HEIDI BISHOP, JASON BISHOP, 
WENDY GARAMENDI, and MARK 
GARAMENDI, and JOHN DOES I-X 
1 Defendants. 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO AUGMENT JUDGMENT 
Case No. 000906072-CN 
Honorable Judge Dever | 
District Judge 
: -j 
The Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel and pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-501, 
UCJA, hereby submit to the Court their memorandum in opposition to Defendants' Motion to 
Augment Judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
Given Defendants' Counsel's length of experience in the practice of law, the fact that he 
offices in his home and has next to no overhead, the lack of difficulty of the post-judgment issues 
Exhibit" J;*1 * "" -J ~ . i - -
herein, the rates charged and the amount of time allegedly incurred are excessive. 
DATED April 22, 2002. 
Ronald L. Dunn, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on April 22, 2002,1 deposited in the United States Mails, postage prepaid, 
copies of the above-described document and this Certificate, addressed to: 
Michael A. Jensen, Esq. 
PO Box 571708 
(730 Three Ftns. # 87) 
SLC, 
